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Summary
The ability to reflect on one’s own mental processes,
termed metacognition, is a defining feature of human
existence [1, 2]. Consequently, a fundamental ques-
tion in comparative cognition is whether nonhuman
animals have knowledge of their own cognitive states
[3]. Recent evidence suggests that people and nonhu-
man primates [4–8] but not less ‘‘cognitively sophisti-
cated’’ species [3, 9, 10] are capable of metacognition.
Here, we demonstrate for the first time that rats are ca-
pable of metacognition—i.e., they know when they do
not know the answer in a duration-discrimination test.
Before taking the duration test, rats were given the op-
portunity to decline the test. On other trials, they were
not given the option to decline the test. Accurate per-
formance on the duration test yielded a large reward,
whereas inaccurate performance resulted in no re-
ward. Declining a test yielded a small but guaranteed
reward. If rats possess knowledge regarding whether
they know the answer to the test, they would be ex-
pected to decline most frequently on difficult tests
and show lowest accuracy on difficult tests that can-
not be declined [4]. Our data provide evidence for
both predictions and suggest that a nonprimate has
knowledge of its own cognitive state.
Results and Discussion
People are sometimes aware of their own cognitive pro-
cesses. For example, a college student entering a class-
room to take a test will often have some knowledge
about how she will perform on the test. It is noteworthy
that this knowledge (whether accurate or inaccurate) is
available before the student actually responds to the
test questions and obtains feedback about perfor-
mance. We can easily assess this familiar experience
(i.e., knowing that we know or do not know the answer)
in humans by requesting verbal reports about our expe-
riences. Of course, this option is not available with non-
verbal species. Consequently, researchers in compara-
tive cognition have sought to identify experimental
conditions in which a human or nonhuman subject could
demonstrate through its behavior knowledge of a cogni-
tive state. Therefore, studies in metacognition test the
hypothesis that animals behave functionally the same
as an organism that is aware of its own cognitive state.
One approach used for studying metacognition in
nonhumans [4] is giving the animal an option to decline
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to take a test. Presumably, an animal that knows that it
does not know the answer to a test question will decline
to take the test. Moreover, being forced to take a test is
likely to degrade performance because forced tests in-
clude trials that would have been declined had that op-
tion been available. Although considerable evidence
supports the existence of metacognition in primates,
a paucity of research has been conducted with other
mammalian species. Developing a rodent model of
metacognition may allow for new opportunities to ex-
plore its underlying neural mechanisms. To this end,
we adapted Hampton’s [4] experimental design with
monkeys for an experiment with rats.
Each trial consisted of three phases: study, choice,
and test phases (Figure 1). In the study phase, a brief
noise was presented for the subject to classify as short
(2–3.62 s) or long (4.42–8 s). Stimuli with intermediate
durations (e.g., 3.62 and 4.42 s) are most difficult to clas-
sify as short or long [11, 12]. By contrast, more widely
spaced intervals (e.g., 2 and 8 s) are easiest to classify.
In the choice phase, the rat was sometimes presented
with two response options, signaled by the illumination
of two nose-poke apertures. On these choice-test trials,
a response in one of these apertures (referred to as
a take-the-test response) led to the insertion of two re-
sponse levers in the subsequent test phase; one lever
was designated as the correct response after a short
noise, and the other lever was designated as the correct
response after a long noise. The other aperture (referred
to as the decline-the-test response) led to the omission
of the duration test. On other trials in the choice phase,
the rat was presented with only one response option; on
these forced-test trials, the rat was required to select the
aperture that led to the duration test (i.e., the option to
decline the test was not available), and this was followed
by the duration test. In the test phase, a correct lever
press with respect to the duration discrimination pro-
duced a large reward of six pellets; an incorrect lever
press produced no reward. A decline response (pro-
vided that this option was, indeed, available) led to
a guaranteed but smaller reward of three pellets.
The rate of declining to take the test increased as the
difficulty of the discrimination increased (Figures 2A–2D;
see also Figure S1 in the Supplemental Data available
online). This observation was confirmed for the mean
of the rats (F[3,6] = 17.6, p < 0.01, Figure 2D) and for
each rat separately (p < 0.01, 0.05, and 0.01 for Figures
2A–2C, respectively). The horizontal axis in Figure 2 rep-
resents an index of stimulus difficulty (see Data Analysis
section below for details). For example, the leftmost
point in each panel corresponds to performance after
the study item was 2 or 8 s, and such an item was the
easiest stimulus to discriminate. By contrast, the right-
most point in each panel corresponds to the most diffi-
cult durations to discriminate (3.62 and 4.42 s).
Accuracy declined as the difficulty of the discrimina-
tion increased, but this decline was greater when the
rats were forced to take the test compared to trials on
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552Figure 1. Schematic Representation of Ex-
perimental Design Showing Trial Sequence
in Study, Choice, and Test Phases
After presentation of a white noise (2–8 s;
study phase), a choice phase provided an op-
portunity for taking or declining a duration
test; declining the test produced a guaran-
teed but smaller reward than was earned if
the test was selected and answered correctly
(test phase). To the extent that a rat is uncer-
tain about how to classify the interval, it will
(1) decline to take the test and (2) show lower
accuracy when forced to take the test relative
to trials on which it chose to take the test. The
gray shading indicates an illuminated nose-
poke (NP) aperture.which the rats chose to take the test (Figures 2E–2H).
This observation was confirmed by an interaction of trial
type and stimulus difficulty for the mean of the rats(F[3,6] = 20.3, p < 0.01, Figure 2H) and for each rat
separately (p < 0.05, 0.01, and 0.05 for Figures 2E–2G,
respectively). No difference between choice- andFigure 2. Rats Decline Difficult Tests and
Show Degraded Accuracy When They Can-
not Decline the Difficult Test
(A–D) Difficult tests (defined as stimulus dura-
tions near the subjective middle of the short-
est and longest durations) were declined
more frequently than easy tests (defined as
stimulus durations near the shortest and lon-
gest durations).
(E–H) The decline in accuracy as a function of
stimulus difficulty was more pronounced
when tests could not be declined (forced
test) compared to tests that could have
been declined (choice test).
The x-axes are plotted in reversed order.
Error bars represent SEM.
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tions because there is little room for improvement. How-
ever, for the most difficult discrimination (rightmost data
in Figures 2E–2H; 3.62 and 4.42 s stimuli), each rat
showed higher accuracy on trials in which it had chosen
to take the test.
The present experiment suggests that rats know when
they do not know the answer to a duration-discrimina-
tion test. The duration discrimination involved classify-
ing brief noises as short or long. Consequently, dura-
tions near the middle of the range are more difficult to
classify. The rats were more likely to decline these diffi-
cult tests, as would be expected if the rats knew that
they did not know the correct duration-discrimination
response. Moreover, when we compared accuracy on
the duration test, the rats were more accurate when
they had chosen to take the duration test compared to
trials in which they were forced to take the test. This pat-
tern is predicted by the metacognition hypothesis be-
cause forced-test performance includes trials that
would have been declined had the option to do so
been available. Knowledge about temporal information
may play a central role in the organization of behavior
[13], and consequently, detailed knowledge about
when events occur [14–20] may have contributed to
our experimental evidence for metacognition.
An important feature of the design of this study is that
we evaluated accuracy on trials in which the rats were
forced to take the test. Moreover, the rats initiated these
forced tests in the same manner as they initiated choice
tests (i.e., with a nose-poke response). These factors
limit the ability of alternative hypotheses to explain our
data. For example, the forced duration tests are unlikely
to have been unexpected and thereby unlikely to have
disrupted accuracy. If forced choices had been surpris-
ing, we would expect longer latencies to respond in
forced tests relative to choice tests. However, there
was no evidence for a difference in the latency to re-
spond with either a nose-poke (t[2] = 1.1, p > 0.05;
mean6 SEM: 0.616 0.19 s and 0.806 0.12 s for choice
and forced tests, respectively) or lever-press response
(t[2] = 0.4, p > 0.05; mean 6 SEM: 2.70 6 0.47 s and
2.65 6 0.28 s for choice and forced tests, respectively).
Consequently, the accuracy difference on forced and
choice tests was not likely to be due to performance dis-
ruption from unexpected forced tests.
Similarly, discrimination of a purely behavioral state
(e.g., physical proximity to the response levers), in con-
trast to discrimination of a cognitive state, is unlikely to
fully account for our data. Discrimination of a purely be-
havioral state predicts equivalent performance on forced
and choice tests, and this prediction is not supported by
our data (Figures 2E–2H). Although our data do not pre-
clude the possibility that the discrimination of behavioral
states contributes to the use of the decline response,
such a contribution could be empirically tested in future
experiments by collecting of video recordings of the rats’
behavior during stimulus presentation. It is also unlikely
that learning a contingency between reinforcement rate
and specific stimulus durations could account for our
data. First, the observed difference in accuracy between
choice and forced tests is not predicted by differential
reinforcement associated with specific stimulus dura-
tions. Second, for a learned contingency to contributeto the observed increase in the decline rate, one must
presuppose that rats would prefer guaranteed small re-
wards more than uncertain large rewards (i.e., that rats
are risk averse). However, there is evidence that rats
are risk prone in a situation similar to our own [21]. Ulti-
mately, it is important to experimentally dissociate stim-
ulus identity and difficulty by evaluation of the ability of
rats to generalize the use of the decline response to a
different discrimination, an ability that has recently
been reported with monkeys [7, 8].
As Hampton [4] has argued, although observing puta-
tive subjective experiences that may accompany meta-
cognition is not possible, progress in the study of evolu-
tion of the human mind and in evaluating the validity of
animal models of human cognition will come from doc-
umenting objective functional features of human con-
scious cognition. To this end, we have documented
the ability of rats to make adaptive decisions about
future behavior contingent on the current availability of
knowledge. Developing a rodent model of metacogni-
tion may promote new opportunities for exploring the
neuroanatomical, neurochemical, neurophysiological,
and molecular mechanisms of metacognition.
Experimental Procedures
Animals
Eight male Sprague-Dawley rats (Harlan, Madison, WI; 249 g, 85
days old) were individually housed in a room with a reversed light
cycle (light offset at 07:00, onset at 19:00). The rats consumed
45 mg pellets (PJAI-0045, Research Diets, New Brunswick, NJ) dur-
ing testing sessions and a ration of 5001-Rodent-Diet (Lab Diet,
Brentwood, MO), which was adjusted so that total daily intake was
15–20 g. Water was continuously available. All procedures were ap-
proved by the institutional animal care and use committee and fol-
lowed guidelines of the National Research Council Guide for the
Care and Use of Laboratory Animals. Five rats rarely declined to
take the duration test (M = 97.8%, SEM =60.01%). The performance
for these five rats was likely to be a result of response bias because it
appeared that these rats failed to learn the experimental contin-
gency of the nose-poke apertures. As a result, these five rats did
not provide evidence for or against metacognition. The rats had par-
ticipated in a pilot study, in which they received a similar training reg-
imen to that described below, during which the reward sizes and in-
tertrial interval were adjusted. All subjects (n = 3) that learned the
experimental contingency are included in the data analysis.
Apparatus
Identical operant chambers (described in [22]), each located in a ven-
tilated sound-attenuation cubicle, contained a recessed food trough
(equipped with a photobeam used for detecting head entries) was
centered between two levers on one wall of the chamber. A 45 mg
pellet dispenser was positioned outside the chamber and attached
to the food trough. A water bottle was placed outside of the chamber
with the tube inserted across from the food trough. This wall also
contained nose-poke apertures on the left and right sides of the
sipper tube. Small white lights were recessed at the back of each
nose-poke aperture. Each nose-poke contained a photobeam that
detected the entry of the rat’s snout. The chamber floor was con-
structed from 19 stainless steel rods. Other equipment in each
chamber included a speaker, clicker, lights, and additional photo-
beams. Lever-press and nose-poke responses were recorded
(10 ms resolution) with MED-PC software (version 4.1) on a computer
in a nearby room.
Procedure
Pretraining
Rats were given one pellet per min accompanied by a click for 30 min
per day on the first pretraining session. On subsequent pretraining
sessions, the left lever was inserted, and each food pellet was
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been earned. Next, the left lever was retracted and the right lever
was inserted until ten additional pellets had been earned. The lever
training session continued, in this manner, until 60 min had passed
or 60 pellets had been earned.
Duration-Discrimination Training
Rats were initially trained to discriminate short and long durations. A
trial consisted of presentation of a white noise (70 dB) for a randomly
and independently selected duration (2.00, 2.44, 2.97, 3.62, 4.42,
5.38, 6.56, and 8.00 s; equally spaced on a logarithmic scale), an in-
sertion of two response levers, the rat’s lever press, feedback, and
retraction of the levers, and this was followed by an intertrial interval
of 45 s. The first four durations (i.e., values less than 4 s, designated
as short durations) were rewarded for pressing one lever (e.g., left),
and the other four durations (values greater than 4 s, designated as
long) were rewarded for pressing the other lever (e.g., right) as de-
scribed elsewhere [23, 24]; the assignment of left and right levers
was counterbalanced across rats prior to the start of the experiment.
Each session lasted 2 hr, 5 days per week, for 35 sessions.
Nose-Poke Pretraining
Rats were trained for three daily sessions to break the photobeam in
the nose-poke apertures. At the beginning of each session, the left
nose-poke light was illuminated and the rat was required to break
the photobeam in the left nose-poke aperture to earn a reward. After
the rat had broken the left nose-poke photobeam, the light in the left
nose poke aperture was turned off and a pellet and a click were de-
livered. This process continued for ten pellets on the left nose-poke
aperture and was followed by a switch to the right nose-poke aper-
ture for the next ten pellets. The nose-poke trials continued, in this
manner, until 60 min had elapsed or 60 pellets had been earned.
Testing
A noise was presented, as described above in Duration-Discrimina-
tion Training. In the choice phase, two nose-poke apertures were
illuminated in two-thirds of the trials (see Figure 1, right). Breaking
the photobeam inside one of the nose-poke apertures (designated
as the take-the-test nose-poke response) caused the lights to be ex-
tinguished, the levers to be inserted, and a duration test to be initi-
ated as described above. Breaking the photobeam inside the other
nose-poke aperture (designated as the decline-the-test nose-poke
response) caused the lights to be extinguished but did not produce
insertion of the levers. Instead, the rat was required to break a photo-
beam inside the food trough to obtain food and terminate the trial.
The assignment of left and right nose-poke apertures to take and
decline responses was counterbalanced across rats before the
experiment began. In the remaining one-third of trials, only the
take-the-test nose-poke aperture was illuminated (see Figure 1,
left); a response in the illuminated nose-poke aperture was required
for insertion of the levers and initiation of a duration test, as
described above. By contrast, a response in the other (i.e., dark)
nose-poke aperture did not advance the rat to the next phase of
the trial. Choice and forced tests were randomly intermixed through-
out the session. The reward size was six or zero pellets after a correct
or incorrect duration-discrimination lever press, respectively. If the
rat declined the duration test, the reward size was three pellets.
The intertrial interval was 8 min, and each session lasted 9 hr, for
22–26 sessions (1546 trials, on average). The long intertrial interval
may have reduced confusion between individual trials and
enhanced the salience of the auditory stimulus.
Data Analysis
Stimulus durations were equally spaced on a logarithmic scale for
ensuring that pairs of durations were equated for difficulty. When
rats are trained to discriminate 2 and 8 s, the point of subjective
equality (i.e., the stimulus duration at which the probability of judg-
ing the stimulus as short or long are equal) occurs at 4 s [11, 12],
which is the geometric mean of 2 and 8 s (i.e., the midpoint on a log-
arithmic scale). Note that the absolute difference between two and
four and between four and eight are equal on a logarithmic scale;
therefore, a point of subjective equality at 4 s means that 2 and 8 s
are equated for stimulus difficulty [11, 12]. Similarly, the second
and seventh stimuli (2.44 and 6.56 s) are equally spaced on a log
scale with respect to 4 s, as are the third and sixth (2.97 and 5.38
s) stimuli and the fourth and fifth (3.62 and 4.42 s) stimuli. Conse-
quently, we pooled the data within identical levels of stimulusdifficulty to obtain four levels of stimulus difficulty. The index of stim-
ulus difficulty (horizontal axes in Figure 2) was calculated as the ab-
solute log distance of each stimulus duration from the geometric
mean of 4 s, expressed in seconds. For example, the most difficult
stimuli to discriminate are closely spaced (3.62 and 4.42 s) near
the geometric mean (rightmost data in Figure 2; index of stimulus dif-
ficulty = 1.1), whereas the easiest stimuli to discriminate are widely
spaced (2 and 8 s; leftmost data in Figure 2; index of stimulus
difficulty = 2.0).
A median latency for each rat was calculated between duration-
stimulus termination and the nose-poke response and between
nose-poke and lever-press responses for choice- and forced-test
trials.
Terminal performance (487 trials, on average) was analyzed with
repeated measures analyses of variance. A value of p < 0.05 was
considered significant.
Supplemental Data
Supplemental Data include one figure and are available with this
article online at http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/content/full/
17/6/551/DC1/.
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